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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
ROY WOMACK II, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CaseNo.970539-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge 
John C. Backlund, denying appellant's Motion to Suppress Evidence following a 
hearing and from final judgment of conviction for Possession of a Controlled 
Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) & 58-37-8(4) (a), following a conditional plea, said 
judgment having been entered July 23,1997. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)Q (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient probable cause set forth in the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant to provide the necessary probable cause for 
issuance of the search warrant? 
2. Does the issuance of an "anticipatory" search warrant violate the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-202, Article I Section 14 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, or the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States? 
A trial Court's legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness." State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). A Court's statutory interpretation is 
reviewed for "correctness." State v. Gallegos, 849 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App. 1993). 
The factual findings underlying the issuance of a search warrant are reviewed under 
a "clearly erroneous" standard, but the conclusions of law based thereon are 
reviewed for "correctness." State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-202. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment against Roy Womack II, for one (1) count 
of Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Drug free Zone, a Class A 
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Misdemeanor. Following the denial of Appellant's Motion to Suppress after hearing 
and argument, Appellant, pursuant to plea agreement and State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 
935 (Utah App. 1988), entered a plea of no contest to said charge. The Court's 
order of judgment was entered on July 23,1997. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter was submitted to the trial Court upon stipulated facts which both 
parties agreed were correctly set forth in the factual statement contained in the 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress with some additions 
by Plaintiff. A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of 
the Court Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress is attached hereto as Addendum 
"A". A copy of Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress is also 
attached hereto as Addendum "B". The facts set forth therein are as follows. 
On February 21,1996, UPS attempted to deliver a package addressed to Roy 
Womack at 120 West 1200 North in Orem, Utah. The address was not a valid 
address, so the UPS employees searched the telephone book and found a Womack 
family living in Orem and delivered the package to that family, although the listing 
was not for a Roy Womack. The package had a return address identified to Eileen 
O'Hara in California. Although there were no Roy Womacks at the residence to 
which the package was delivered, the occupants opened the package and looked 
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through its contents, discovering some marijuana. The Womacks then took the 
package to the Orem City Police station and turned it over to the Orem City officers. 
Six (6) days later, the UPS officer received a call from a person who 
identified herself as Eileen O'Hara, who, upon being told that the package had been 
delivered to the wrong address, told the UPS workers to deliver the package to 127 
West 1200 North, Orem, Utah. After the package had been turned over to the 
police, an individual who claimed to be Roy Womack contacted the Womacks who 
had received the package and was informed that the package was not there. 
The Orem police determined that the new address was a good address and 
that the residents shown as living at that address were John and Kathleen Green. 
There was no record of a Roy Womack living at the address. The law enforcement 
officers, while still in possession of the package, sought permission of the Court to 
conduct a "controlled delivery" of the package and to conduct a search of the 
premises for additional evidence including "evidence of possession of the home and 
a nexus to the evidence." This request was made by virtue of an Affidavit in 
Support of a Search Warrant. The affidavit set forth basically the same facts set 
forth above, but included some general nonspecific statements relating to the affiant 
officer's experience in the drug enforcement field. The affidavit identified the 
residents of the home at 127 West 1200 North, Orem, as John and Kathleen Green, 
4 
a married couple. There was no statement in the affidavit that indicated any 
information which would associate the Greens with Eileen O'Hara or Roy Womack. 
There was no information to link the Greens in any way with drug use or drug sales. 
(Addendum "C") 
Based upon the affidavit, a judge issued the warrant authorizing the officers 
to search the residence following the delivery of the UPS package including the 
persons and vehicles of any persons present at the time of the delivery. (Addendum 
"C") The law enforcement officers then took the package to the residence 
accompanied by a UPS delivery person who then delivered the package to the 
residence. The person who answered the door identified himself as Roy Womack 
and signed for the package. The UPS employee then relayed that information to the 
police officers who then entered the residence and apprehended Appellant in 
possession of the package and the marijuana. 
Following the denial of his Motion to Suppress, Appellant entered a 
conditional plea of no contest as part of a plea bargain upon the condition that he 
retain the right to appeal the Court's denial of his motion to suppress. Judgment 
was entered against the Appellant on July 23,1997. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The lower Court committed reversible error by issuing a search warrant 
5 
where the affidavit in support thereof did not state sufficient probable cause to 
support a warrant. The affidavit in this case did not state sufficient probable cause 
to show that the person listed as the addressee on the package lived at the corrected 
address, especially in light of the fact that the sender of the package had already put 
the wrong address on the package. The statements in the affidavit are, in fact, to the 
contrary. The probable cause affidavit did not provide sufficient information to the 
magistrate to support the issuance of a warrant. 
The issuance of an "anticipatory search warrant" violates the provisions of 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; Article I, Section 14 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah; and the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-
23-202 guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The warrant in the present case was not based upon conditions or facts which were 
in existence at the time of the issuance of the warrant, but upon future facts which 
were in control of the officers. This appears to be a case of first impression in Utah. 
Appellant contends that the statutes of this state and our constitutional provisions do 
not support the issuance of anticipatory warrants which are contingent upon and 
require some further conduct on the part of the police and/or other individuals to 
develop probable cause subsequent to the issuance of the warrant. The Court 




THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
UPHOLDING A SEARCH WARRANT WHICH WAS NOT BASED 
UPON PROBABLE CAUSE. 
The affidavit in support of search warrant in this case did not set forth 
probable cause sufficient to support a search warrant. The affidavit did not set forth 
any reliable evidence that the individual named Roy Womack to whom the package 
was addressed resided at the address on the package. The statement in the affidavit 
is, in fact, to the contrary. It sets forth that a married couple, John and Kathleen 
Green lived at that address and states no reason to believe that either of those 
individuals were suspects or that there was any corroborating evidence that drug 
activity was being conducted at the residence named in the affidavit. There was no 
evidence that any contraband would be located on the premises since the officers 
still had the contraband in their possession at the time of the application and 
issuance of the search warrant. (See Addendum "D") 
The case law of the United States interpreting the standard for issuance of 
search warrants without violating the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure 
is set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The Court held that in 
determining whether probable cause exists, the magistrate must "make a practical, 
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common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence 
of a crime will be found in a particular place." 462 U.S. 213, at 239. 
Utah case law clearly sets forth the requirement that the affidavit in support of 
the search warrant clearly set forth probable cause to believe that the evidence is at 
the location sought to be searched. See State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 
App. 1992). The purpose of the requirement is to limit the intrusion of law 
enforcement officers to those situations where the intrusion is based upon probable 
cause and to eliminate "fishing expeditions" on the part of law enforcement. This is 
in contrast to those cases where the postal service may receive a suspect package 
and then contacts the addressee to pick up the package. Those situations are based 
upon action and acceptance of the contacted individual to come to the post office or 
UPS office and claim the package as opposed to the present case. No intrusion of 
the home is involved in those situations, nor is the possibility that someone who has 
no involvement in criminal activity will have their home invaded by law enforcement 
officers. In the present case, the actions of the officers raise that risk, and are not 
justified by probable cause that the persons at the residence were in possession of 
contraband prior to the delivery of the package. 
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There was no evidence that the person to whom the package was addressed 
was aware that the package contained contraband. The Womacks to whom the 
package was originally delivered did not discover that the package contained 
contraband until they had opened the package. The only evidence set forth in the 
affidavit was that a person who claimed to be Roy Womack asked the Womacks, to 
whom the package had been delivered, if they had received a package. Under the 
ruling of the lower Court in this case, a person who received an unsolicited package 
which contained a controlled substance, could have his home searched and could be 
prosecuted for possession without any other showing demonstrating his prior 
knowledge of the contents once he or she accepted delivery of the package. 
Clearly, the Court would not support issuance of a warrant in a case where 
the officers introduced contraband into a residence in order to establish probable 
cause to search the residence. In the present case, where the officers did not know 
or establish that the person to whom the package was addressed actually lived at the 
corrected residence, their introduction of the evidence into the residence through the 
agency of UPS causes a similar situation. 
At the time of the issuance of the warrant the only evidence of contraband 
was that which set forth that the contraband was in the possession of the police, not 
any other person, including Appellant. The search warrant issued (see Addendum 
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"D") falsely sets forth in paragraph 2, that the property sought to be seized is "most 
probably located at the premises also set forth below." The warrant authorized the 
search of the residence within ten (10) days from the date of issuance without any 
requirement that the substance be delivered specifically to Roy Womack. Further, in 
paragraph 3 of the search warrant, the Court stated: "The person or entity in 
possession of the property is a party to the alleged illegal conduct." There was no 
statement set forth in the affidavit in support of the search warrant to indicate that 
the person to whom the package was addressed knew it contained contraband, let 
alone the only persons identified to live at the corrected address, the Greens. Any 
person who answered the door and received the package would subject the 
residence to search including individuals who were not named in any part of the 
affidavit as being persons suspected of drug use or dealings. 
Appellant asserts that the very reason for requiring some evidence of 
probable cause is to avoid such situations. The warrant in this case was not 
supported by probable cause sufficient to justify violating Appellant's right to be 
free from unreasonable search and seizure and the evidence resulting from search 
based upon said warrant should have been suppressed. Further, the findings set 
forth by the magistrate in the search warrant as to paragraphs 3 and 4 are clearly 
erroneous, in that the information in the affidavit clearly indicated to the contrary. 
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There were no findings made to support the authorization of the search following the 
delivery, to wit: that the persons at the residence were the persons to whom the 
package was addressed; or that the persons at the residence had any knowledge that 
the package contained contraband and were involved in criminal activity. 
POINT II 
THE ISSUANCE OF AN "ANTICIPATORY" SEARCH WARRANT 
VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-202 
AND ARTICLE I SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
The search warrant issued for the search of Appellant's residence in this case 
was an "anticipatory" warrant. An anticipatory warrant is one which authorizes a 
search in anticipation of an event taking place. In this case, that event was the 
delivery of the package to the address on the package. There is a split of opinion on 
the issue of the legality of anticipatory warrants by Courts which have addressed 
that issue. Utah has yet to address the legality of such warrants. Appellant suggests 
that Utah should adopt the position taken by those states which do not uphold 
anticipatory warrants. The states which have failed to recognize anticipatory 
warrants have statutory provisions regarding search warrants that are similar to that 
of Utah. 
The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Berge, 634 P.2d 947 (1981), was 
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faced with a fact situation which closely resembles that of the present case. The law 
enforcement officers received information that a certain individual was receiving 
contraband through the mail. Based upon the information from the informant and 
the fact that a trained dog alerted to a postal package addressed to the defendant, the 
officers obtained a warrant for the search of the package which had arrived at the 
local UPS terminal. The package was found to contain contraband. The officers 
then obtained a second search warrant to search the person and residence of the 
person to whom the package was addressed. The officers re-wrapped the package 
and arranged to have it delivered by a police officer in a UPS truck and uniform. 
The defendant accepted the package and took it into his residence, but before the 
police could execute the warrant, he left in his car. The officers could not locate 
him and went ahead and executed the search warrant finding the package and other 
contraband in the defendant's residence. The Arizona Court stated at 634 P.2d 948: 
"A search warrant may not be issued unless the issuing magistrate has probable 
cause to believe that a crime was committed or is in the process of being 
committed." The Court found that the package in that case, as in the present case, 
was in the possession of the police at the time the magistrate issued the search 
warrant and therefore no crime was being committed. What the defendant did with 
the package would determine whether or not he had committed a crime. The Court 
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held that it was not reasonable to issue a warrant upon future acts that "can only 
come into being by actions of the persons seeking the warrant." 634 P.2d at 949. 
Additionally, in People v. Ross, 659 N.E.2d 1319 (111.1995), UPS accidently 
opened a letter which was found to contain cocaine. The UPS employees contacted 
law enforcement officers who confirmed the presence of cocaine. The officers then 
made arrangements to have UPS deliver the letter to the addressee, the defendant. 
Prior to the delivery of the letter, and prior to the commission of a crime by the 
defendant, the officers obtained a warrant for the search of the defendant's 
residence once the package had been delivered. UPS delivered the package and 
five (5) minutes later the officers executed the search warrant. The Illinois Court 
was presented with the same issue which is present in this case. Did the statutes 
and constitution of Illinois allow the issuance of anticipatory search warrants? 
The Illinois statute controlling the case, Section 108-3 of the Illinois Code of 
Criminal Procedure provides: 
(a)...upon the written complaint of any person under oath or affirmation which 
states facts sufficient to show probable cause and which particularly describes 
the place or person, or both, to be searched and the things to be seized, any 
judge may issue a search warrant for the seizure of the following: (1) Any 
instruments, articles, or things which have been used in the commission of, or 
which may constitute evidence of, the offense in connection with which the 
warrant is issued. 
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The Illinois Court interpreted the foregoing provision to prohibit the issuance of 
anticipatory warrants. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-202, contains a similar requirement that the property 
sought to be seized must have been used or probable cause must be for crimes 
which have been or are being committed at the time of the issuance of the warrant. 
The Utah statute provides: 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant if there is 
probable cause to believe it: 
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(2) has been used or is being possessed for the purpose of being used to 
commit or conceal the commission of an offense; or 
(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 
The language in the Utah statute clearly restricts the issuance of a search warrant to 
those situations where some crime has been, or is being committed. The language is 
in the present or the past tense, i.e., was unlawfully acquired; is unlawfully 
possessed; has been used; or is being used; or is evidence of illegal conduct. 
Nothing in the section provides any authority to allow issuance of a search warrant 
based upon anticipated future conduct of the law enforcement officers, for future 
anticipated illegal conduct or things which may be used in the future for illegal 
purposes. 
At the time of the issuance of the warrant, no crime was being committed by 
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Appellant, nor was any such crime alleged to have been committed by the affidavit 
in support of the warrant. The evidence sought to be seized, to wit: the UPS 
package, was already in the possession of the police. No crime in regard to that 
contraband could be committed by Appellant until the officers introduced the item to 
be seized into the possession of Appellant through the UPS employees who were 
acting in concert and at the direction of the officers. 
In yet another similar factual situation under a similar statutory provision, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado in People v. Poirez, 904 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1995) reached 
the same conclusion as to the legality of anticipatory search warrants. In that case, 
UPS also discovered a package which contained contraband and reported it to the 
authorities. The package was turned over to the Vail, Colorado, police. The police 
agency investigated the address and the addressee, finding no record of the 
addressee at the address listed. The officers obtained a warrant to search the 
premises which was conditioned upon two facts: (1) A task force agent will deliver 
the package to the residence to be searched. (2) Someone from inside the residence 
will accept the package and take it inside. The package was delivered to the 
address and upon delivery a person took the package into the residence. With the 
door still open the person who had accepted the package called for the person to 
whom the package was addressed, whereupon the defendant appeared and took the 
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package. The defendant was immediately arrested. The Colorado Court held that 
the use by the legislature of the present tense language required the evidence to be 
located on the premises at the time the warrant was issued. The Court determined 
that the warrant was an anticipatory warrant and therefore unlawful since the 
evidence was not present at the premises until after the officers had taken it there. 
The Court in Poirez, acknowledged that the majority of federal Courts have 
upheld anticipatory warrants. The Court indicated that the reason some federal 
Courts are recognizing anticipatory warrants is a result of a change to the provisions 
of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which was made in 1990. 
Prior to the change, the rule contained the term "is located" in allowing the issuance 
of a search warrant for contraband or other evidence. The 1990 change removed 
that term from the rule. The Colorado Court cited the 1990 advisory committee 
note as follows: 
Rule 41(a)(1) permits anticipatory warrants by omitting the words "is 
located," which in the past required that in all instances the object of the 
search had to be located within the district at the time the warrant was issued. 
Now a search for property or a person within the district, or expected to be 
within the district, is valid if it otherwise complies with this rule. 904 P.2d at 
883. 
Since Colorado's statute contained language which required the magistrate to find 
probable cause that the property to be searched for be "located at, in, or upon the 
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premises, person, place or thing to be searched", the use of the present tense 
prohibited the search for property that was anticipated to be at a certain place. 904 
P.2d at 882. 
Utah's law has not been changed or altered to allow anticipatory warrants. 
Until the legislature deems it advisable to amend to allow such change, Utah's 
statute remains a bar to anticipatory warrants. 
The allowance of anticipatory warrants creates a great risk of intrusion by law 
enforcement officers into the residences of innocent citizens if a warrant may be 
based upon the facts set forth in the probable cause statement submitted to the 
magistrate in the present case and upon some future acts. There was no evidence 
presented to the magistrate to provide probable cause that to show that the only 
identified residents of the premises sought to be searched were connected with the 
sender of the package or the addressee. Had one of those individuals been at home 
and accepted delivery of the package, the search would have ensued under the 
provisions of the warrant, whether or not the person to whom the package was 
addressed was present or not. The authority of the warrant did not restrict delivery 
of the package to someone identified as Roy Womack, but allowed the officers to 
search upon any person accepting the package. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the search warrant issued in this case should have 
been suppressed by the trial Court and that the failure to do so constituted reversible 
error. The affidavit did not contain sufficient probable cause to establish that the 
contraband sought to be seized was presently in the location sought to be searched. 
Further, the allowance of the procedure used in this case would allow a person who 
had some reason to incriminate another to set up the other by mailing a package 
containing contraband to the other and then inform the police that a package with 
contraband was to be delivered. The provisions of the warrant were not supported 
by probable cause, nor were the findings of probable cause set forth in the warrant 
true. The property described was not located at the premises sought to be searched 
nor was the person or entity in possession of the property a party to the alleged 
illegal conduct. The persons in possession of the property at that time were the law 
enforcement officers. 
Anticipatory search warrants are not authorized by Utah statute or 
constitutional provision. No warrant shall issue except upon probable cause. The 
right of citizens to be free from unreasonable search cannot be violated by allowing 
search warrants to issue upon conditions which may or may not exist in the future 
and which are based upon unknown future acts of officers or others. For the 
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reasons set forth above, Appellant submits the trial Court committed error by 
refusing to suppress the evidence obtained by the search in this case and Appellant's 
conviction should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of March, 1998. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
MICHAEL B^ESPEtN \ 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 30th day of March, 1998, 
two (2) copies of the foregoing brief to the following: 
KAYBRYSON 
Utah County Attorney 
LAURA CABANILLA 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, UT 84606 
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ADDENDUM 
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 14 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) 
Utah Code Annotated, § 58-37-8(4) (a) 
Utah Code Annotated, § 77-23-202 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
Addendum "A", Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of the Court 
Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Addendum "B", Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress 
Addendum "C", Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant 
Addendum "D", Search Warrant 
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Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 582 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 9. [Excess ive ba i l a n d fines — Crue l pun i sh -
ments . ] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec . 10. [Trial by ju ry . ] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec . 11. [Courts o p e n — R e d r e s s of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a p a r t y . 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of a c c u s e d pe r sons . ] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of tha t examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in par t at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by s ta tute or rule. 1994 
Sec . 13. [Prosecut ion by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec . 14. [ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to 
be seized. 1896 
Sec . 15. [ F r e e d o m of s p e e c h and of the p r e s s — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the 
t ruth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, 
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec . 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of 
absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elect ions to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military, 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be 
prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing 
contracts . ] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason d e n n e d — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 1896 
Sec. 21 . [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for publ ic use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without jus t compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, 
privilege or immunity. 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operat ion of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights re ta ined by people . ] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair 
or deny others retained by the people. 1896 
Sec. 26. [Provis ions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be 
otherwise. 1896 
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AMENDMENT I 
[Rel igious a n d pol i t ica l freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment <?/* 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
 a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to b e a r a rms . ] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
 a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any hous^ 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in
 a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[ U n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s and se izures . ] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house^ 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal act ions — Provis ions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
 a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval force^ 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War Or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall h e 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public u s ^ 
without jus t compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of t h e 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; tt> 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favoi-t 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VTI 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall bfe 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — P u n i s h m e n t . ] 
Excessive ball shall not he required, nor excessive dn^ 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT EX 
[Righ t s r e t a i n e d by people . ] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by tta 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers r e s e r v e d to s t a t e s or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved tn 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against s t a t e s — Restr ict ion of judicial power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be cot*, 
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign Stat$. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of Pres ident and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vot^ 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state wit^ 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person votetf 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for a$ 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all per. 
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for a$ 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which list$ 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of 
the Government of the United States, directed to the PresL 
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in ih% 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all 
the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—Th$ 
person having the greatest number of votes for President, 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority of th$ * 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person hav$ 
such majority, then from the persons having the highest 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for a* 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose immedi* 
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, 
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. 
And if the House of Representatives shall not choose % 
President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upot^ 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The 
person having the greatest number of votes as "Vice-President^ 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the 
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for th$ 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall w 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligi"»e 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-
President of the United States. 
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section (8). Each separate violation of this subsection is a 
third degree felony and is also subject to a civil penalty 
not to exceed $5,000. 
(b) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section £8-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion. 
(c) Civil penalties assessed under this subsection £hall 
be deposited in the General Fund. 
(12) (a) The failure of a pharmacist in charge to submit 
information to the database as required under this section 
after the division has submitted a specific written r e q u e s t 
for the information or when the division determined the 
individual has a demonstrable pattern of failing to submit 
the information as required is grounds for the division to 
take the following actions in accordance with Section 
58-1-401: 
(i) refuse to issue a license to the individual; 
(ii) refuse to renew the individual's license; 
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation 
the license; 
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the 
individual; 
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and 
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000 
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the 
required information is not submitted. 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (#)(vi) 
shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 08-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion. 
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the 
database in accordance with this section may not be held 
civilly liable for having submitted the information. 
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to 
establish and operate the database shall be funded by 
appropriations from the General Fund. 
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated with-
out the use of any resources within the Commerce Service 
Fund. 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting 
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the 
submitting drug outlet. 1996 
58-37-8. Prohibi ted acts — Penalt ies . 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to po5sess 
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages 
in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing 
series of two or more violations of Title 58, 
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate 
occasions that are undertaken in concert w i t h 
five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, surwr* 
sor, or any other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (iv 
with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or l\
 0r 
controlled substance analog is guilty of a secPn 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent rtjr 
viction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV c 
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upo-
a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a secon' 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guiltyc 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subst 
quent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsectio: 
(l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable b-
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less thai 
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition oj 
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the 
person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally tc 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, diredlj 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this subsection; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or persofl in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or njorc, 
is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, fl*3*1* 
juana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less 
than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog*u 
guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the (°m 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, «» 
the amount is more than one ounce but less thafl 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of p r o p ^ 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confined61" 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of poises* 
sion of any controlled substance by a person, that pe1^011 
shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included lfl 
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than on£ 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdeme^110* 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a cl^ss 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent convict*011 
the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating S u b s e t 
(2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
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(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misde-
meanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or 
distribution of a controlled substance a license num-
ber which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or repre-
sent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apoth-
ecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other au-
thorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or 
attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a 
prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any per-
son known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any 
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure 
by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled 
substance from another source, fraud, forgery, decep-
tion, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or writ-
ten order for a controlled substance, or the use of a 
false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or 
written order for a controlled substance, or to utter 
the same, or to alter any prescription or written order 
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, 
plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, 
or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other 
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any 
likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or 
container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) 
is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a 
person not authorized under this chapter who commits 
any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 
58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under 
Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and 
classifications under Subsection (4Kb) if the act is com-
mitted: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary 
school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or 
post-secondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, sta-
dium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsec-
tions (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care 
facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or 
recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, 
arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot 
or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or 
grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through 
(viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of 
a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of 
not less than five years if the penalty that would other-
wise have been established but for this subsection would 
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of 
the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not 
eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been 
established would have been less than a first degree 
felony but for this subsection, a person convicted under 
this subsection is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this 
subsection that the actor mistakenly believed the indi-
vidual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the 
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where 
the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) 
or was unaware that the location where the act occurred 
was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is 
specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any 
offense unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction guilty 
of one degree less than the maximum penalty prescribed for 
that offense. 
(7) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is 
in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administra-
tive penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal 
law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal 
under federal law or the law of another state for the same 
act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(8) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evi-
dence or proof which shows a person or persons produced, 
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a con-
trolled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that 
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character 
of the substance or substances. 
(9) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good 
faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not 
for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction 
and supervision. 
(10) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under 
this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses 
an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or 
investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in 
the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and 
legitimate scope of his employment. 
(11) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of 
any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, 
the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 1997 
58-37-8.5. Applicabil i ty of Title 76 prosecutions under 
this chapter. 
Unless specifically excluded in or inconsistent with the 
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of Title 76, Chapters 
1, 2, 3, and 4, are fully applicable to prosecutions under this 
chapter. 1997 
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(iv) minimizes the degree of discretion to be exer-
cised by the individual enforcement officers operating 
the checkpoint; and 
(v) maximizes the safety of the motorist and the 
enforcement officers. 
(3) Upon determination by the magistrate that the plan 
meets the requirements of Subsection (2}(b), the magistrate 
shall sign the authorization and issue it to the command level 
officer, retaining a copy for the court's file. 
(4) A copy of the plan and signed authorization shall be 
issued to the checkpoint command level officer participating in 
the operation of the checkpoint. 
(5) Any enforcement officer participating in the operation of 
the checkpoint shall conform his activities as nearly as prac-
ticable to the procedures outlined in the plan. 
(6) The checkpoint command level officer shall be available 
to exhibit a copy of the plan and signed authorization to any 
motorist who has been stopped at the checkpoint upon request 
of the motorist. 1997 
77-23-105. F a i l u r e to s t o p — C r i m i n a l l iabili ty. 
Any person who intentionally and knowingly passes, with-
out stopping as required, any administrative traffic check-
point operated under the authority of a magistrate as provided 
in Section 77-23-104 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1992 
PART 2 
SEARCH WARRANTS 
77-23-201. " S e a r c h w a r r a n t " def ined. 
A search warrant is an order issued by a magistrate in the 
name of the state and directed to a peace officer, describing 
with particularity the thing, place, or person to be searched 
and the property or evidence to be seized by him and brought 
before the magistrate. 1994 
77-23-202. Grounds for i ssuance . 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search 
warrant if there is probable cause to believe it: 
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of an 
offense; or 
(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 1994 
77-23-203. Condit ions precedent to i ssuance. 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly describing 
the person or place to be searched and the person, property, or 
evidence to be seized. 
(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal 
conduct, and is in the possession of a person or entity for which 
there is insufficient probable cause shown to the magistrate to 
believe tha t such person or entity is a party to the alleged 
illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a 
finding by the magistrate tha t the evidence sought to be seized 
cannot be obtained by subpoena, or that such evidence would 
be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if sought by 
subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant 
issued, the magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such 
conditions tha t reasonably afford protection of the following 
interests of the person or entity in possession of such evidence: 
(a) protection against unreasonable interference with 
normal business; 
(b) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected 
confidential sources of information; or 
(c) protection against prior or direct restraints on con-
stitutionally protected rights. 1994 
77-23-204. E x a m i n a t i o n of c o m p l a i n a n t a n d w i t n e s s e s 
— Witness n o t in phys i ca l p r e s e n c e of m a g i s -
t r a t e — D u p l i c a t e o r ig ina l w a r r a n t s — Re-
t u r n . 
(1) All evidence to be considered by a magistrate in the 
issuance of a search warrant shall be given on oath and either 
reduced to writing or recorded verbatim. Transcription of the 
recorded testimony need not precede the issuance of the 
warrant . Any person having standing to contest the search 
may request and shall be provided with a transcription of the 
recorded testimony in support of the application for the 
warrant. 
(2) When the circumstances make it reasonable to do so in 
the absence of an affidavit, a search warrant may be issued 
upon sworn oral testimony of a person who is not in the 
physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate 
is satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the 
warrant . The sworn oral testimony may be communicated to 
the magistrate by telephone or other appropriate means and 
shall be recorded and transcribed. After transcription, the 
statement shall be certified by the magistrate and filed with 
the court. This s ta tement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for 
purposes of this section. 
(a) The grounds for issuance and contents of the war-
rant issued pursuant to Subsection (2) shall be those 
required by this chapter. Prior to issuance of the warrant , 
the magistrate shall require the law enforcement officer 
or the prosecuting attorney who is requesting the war ran t 
to read to him verbatim the contents of the warrant . The 
magistrate may direct that specific modifications be made 
in the warrant . Upon approval, the magistrate shall 
direct the law enforcement officer or the prosecuting 
attorney for the government who is requesting the war-
ran t to sign the magistrate's name on the warrant . This 
warrant shall be called a duplicate original warrant and 
shall be deemed a war ran t for purposes of this chapter. In 
these cases the magistrate shall cause to be made an 
original warrant . The magistrate shall enter the exact 
time of issuance of the duplicate original warrant on the 
face of the original warrant . 
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant and the 
original warrant shall be in conformity with this chapter, 
Upon return, the magistrate shall require the person who 
gave the sworn oral testimony establishing the grounds 
for issuance of the warran t to sign a copy of the transcript, 
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate shall issue a. 
search warrant . 1994 
77-23-205. T i m e for s e r v i c e — Officer m a y request as* 
s i s tance . 
(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the war ran t 
that it be served in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral 
testimony state a reasonable cause to believe a search is 
necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good 
reason; in which case he may insert a direction tha t it be 
served any time of the day or night. An officer may request 
other persons to assist him in conducting the search. 
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from 
the date of issuance. Any search warrant not executed within 
this time shall be void and shall be returned to the court or 
magistrate as not executed. 1994 
77-23-206. R e c e i p t for p r o p e r t y t a k e n . 
When the officer seizes property pursuant to a search 
warrant, he shall give a receipt to the person from whom it 
was seized or in whose possession it was found. If no person ie> 
present, the officer shall leave the receipt in the place where 
he found the property Failure to give or leave a receipt shall 
not render the evidence seized inadmissible at trial. 1994 
407 JUDICIAL CODE 78-3-4 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels, 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court, 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals, and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court 1988 
78-2a-3. C o u r t of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex 
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12 1, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony, 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity, 
d) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply \\ ith the require 
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings 1996 
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s by S u p r e m e Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court 1986 
78-2a-5. Loca t ion of C o u r t of Appea l s . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state 1986 
C H A P T E R 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3 1 to 78 3-2 Repealed 
78-3 3 Term of judges — Vacancy 
78-3-4 Jurisdiction — Appeals 
78-3-5 Repealed 
78-3-6 Terms — Minimum of once quarterly 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11 Repealed 
78-3-11 5 State District Court Administrative System 
78-3-12 Repealed 
78-3-12 5 Costs of system 
78-3-13 Repealed 
78-3-13 4 Transfer of court operating responsibilities — 
Facilities — Staff— Budget 
78-3-13 5, 78-3-14 Repealed 
78-3-14 2 District court case management 
78-3-14 5 Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17 Repealed 
78-3-17 5 Application of savings accruing to counties 
78-3-18 Judicial Administration Act — Short title 
78-3-19 Purpose of act 
78-3-20 Definitions 
78-3-21 Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — 
Reports 
78-3-21 5 Data bases for judicial boards 
78-3-22 Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties 
78-3-23 Administrator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary 
78-3-24 Court administrator — Powers, duties, and 
responsibilities 
78-3-25 Assistants for administrator of the courts — 
Appointment of trial court executives 
78-3-26 Courts to provide information and statistical 
data to administrator of the courts 
78-3-27 Annual judicial conference 
78-3-28 Repealed 
78-3-29 Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge — 
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers 
— Duties 
78-3-30 Duties of the clerk of the district court 
78-3-31 Court commissioners — Qualifications — Ap-
pointment — Functions governed by rule 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 1971, 1981, 1988 
78-3-3. Term of j u d g e s — Vacancy. 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment Thereafter, the 
term of office forjudges of the district courts is six years, and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified 1988 
78-3-4. J u r i s d i c t i o n — A p p e a l s . 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law 
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KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
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100 East Center, Suite 2100 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH -- OREM MUNICIPAL DIVISION 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROY CLINTON WOMACK II 
Defendant(s). 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 961000485 
JUDGE JOHN C. BACKLUND 
This matter came before the Court on February 26, 199 7, the 
Honorable John C. Backlund presiding, for oral arguments on 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant submitted to 
the Court a written memorandum in support of the motion. Plaintiff 
submitted a written response in opposition thereto. Both memoranda 
proffered the factual basis controlling this matter, and appropri-
ate arguments on the issues of law. These memoranda had been 
previously received by the Court, and form part of the Court's 
record. 
At the argument hearing, Defendant was represented by Mr. 
Michael Esplin, Esq.. The Plaintiff was represented by Mr. Curtis 
L. Larson, Deputy Utah County Attorney. Parties stipulated to 
submission of the matter for decision based upon the written 
memoranda before the Court, The facts, as contained in Defendant's 
memorandum, were generally stipulated to by the parties, with 
Plaintiff requesting the Court take notice of certain additions or 
clarifications proffered in Plaintiff's response memorandum. 
Defendant did not object to the Court accepting these additions and 
clarifications as relevant parts of the facts controlling this 
matter. Based upon the stipulation of the parties, no oral 
argument was made to the Court. 
NOW THE COURT, having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the 
parties, and being fully apprised in the premises, hereby makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on February 21, 1996, agents of the United Parcel 
Service ("UPS") attempted to deliver a package addressed to a Roy 
Womack at the address of 120 West 1200 North, Orem, Utah. It was 
discovered that the address did not exist. 
2. That the package was sent from the address of 3002 
Honolulu Avenue #18, La Cresenta, California, 91214, by an Eileen 
0'Hara. 
3. That UPS agents looked in the local telephone directory 
and located a family named Womack living at 233 East 1000 South, 
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Orem, Utah, and this family being the only Womack family in the 
directory, delivered the package to that family, at that address. 
4. That the Womack family living at 233 East 1000 South, 
Orem, Utah, opened the package believing in good faith that the 
package was for them. 
5. That after the Womack family opened the package they 
discovered that it was not for them, and that it also might contain 
a controlled substance, namely, marijuana. 
6. That Mrs. Womack took the package to the Orem City Police 
Department and turned it, and its contents, over to police 
officials. 
7. That once in the possession of police officials, the 
substance in the package was determined to be marijuana, a 
controlled substance, and weighed twenty-eight (28) grams. 
8. That on February 27, 1996, the Womack family living at 
233 East 1000 South, Orem, Utah, had a male visitor at their home. 
This male individual stated that he was "Roy Womack, " and asked 
about the package. The male was told that the package was not 
there. 
9. That in the evening of February 27, 1996, the Womack 
family residing at 233 East 1000 South, Orem, Utah, received a 
telephone call from an female who identified herself as "Eileen 
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O'Hara" and asked about the package. She was also told that the 
package was not there. 
10. That on February 27, 1996, the package's sender, Eileen 
O'Hara, made contact with UPS and requested the package be located, 
and delivered to a corrected address, that being, 127 West 1200 
North, Orem, Utah. 
11. That Eileen O'Hara did not change the name of the 
addressee (Roy Womack) , only the address to which the package was 
to be delivered. 
12. That on February 28, 1996, a UPS agent contacted Eileen 
O'Hara by telephone and indicated to her that the package would be 
delivered this date to the corrected address between 12:00 P.M. and 
3:00 P.M., and that the addressee would have to be personally 
present, as his signature would be required on a receipt of 
delivery. Eileen O'Hara assured the UPS agent that the addressee, 
Roy Womack, would be present at the residence during that time, and 
that she would "page" the addressee. 
13. That on February 28, 199 6, Sgt. Jerry Harper, Provo City 
Police Department, assigned to the Utah County Narcotics 
Enforcement Task Force ("NET"), presented an affidavit in support 
of a search warrant to Judge Guy R. Burningham, Fourth District 
Court, State of Utah, seeking the issuance of a search warrant for 
the residence located at the corrected address of 127 West 1200 
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North, Orem, Utah, as NET officers would be performing a 
"controlled delivery" of the package to the address, and then after 
delivery desired to search the residence for the package and any 
other controlled substance, and associated drug related 
paraphernalia. 
14. That upon reviewing the affidavit, Judge Burningham found 
probable cause to issue the search warrant, and did so, issuing it 
February 28, 1996 at 11:40 A.M. This search warrant was a "no-
knock, " "daytime only" search warrant, which could only be validly 
executed after delivery of the package to the residence. 
15. That on February 28, 1996, Sgt Harper went with a UPS 
agent to deliver the package to the addressee, Roy Womack, at 127 
West 1200 North, Orem, Utah. The package remained in Sgt. Harper's 
control until reaching the residence address. The package was then 
given to the UPS agent while both men were in the UPS delivery 
truck's package/cargo area. 
16. That the UPS agent took the package to the residence's 
front door, and after announcing his presence, was met by a male 
individual at the door. The male identified himself to the UPS 
agent as Roy Womack. The male individual signed the UPS receipt of 
delivery with the name Roy Womack. The package was left by the UPS 
agent with the addressee. After delivery, the UPS agent returned 
to the delivery truck and advised Sgt. Harper that the package had 
5 
been delivered to a male, wearing a white T-shirt and glasses, who 
identified himself as Roy Womack, both orally and in written form 
on the receipt. 
17. That upon receiving information the package had been 
received by the addressee Roy Womack at the residence, NET officers 
waited a period of ten (10) minutes. 
18. That after waiting that period, NET officers converged on 
the residence, executing the search warrant. 
19. That the male who received the package from the UPS agent 
was the sole person found in the residence at the time the search 
warrant was executed, and was found in the basement area of the 
residence. That the male was identified as the Defendant, Roy 
Clinton Womack II. 
20. That as a result of the search, the package was found, 
opened, in the Defendant's bedroom, the marijuana having been 
removed. 
21. That the bag containing the delivered marijuana was 
located in the Defendant's bedroom closet, with the marijuana still 
enclosed. 
22. That other items of drug related paraphernalia were also 
located in the Defendant's bedroom. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the affidavit by Sgt. Jerry Harper, in support of 
the issuance of the search warrant, supplied the requisite 
information regarding the proximity in time of events and the 
location to be searched to form probable cause for the issuance of 
the search warrant for the residence. 
2. That the affidavit by Sgt. Jerry Harper sufficiently set 
forth information with which the magistrate was made aware: (1) of 
the factual circumstances surrounding the police's interception of 
the package containing the controlled substance; (2) that the pack-
age, and controlled substance was then in possession of the police; 
(3) that the package's sender (Eileen O'Hara) and addressee (Roy 
Womack) were yet seeking its delivery to the addressee at the 
location officers were seeking the search warrant for; (4) that the 
officers were desiring to perform a "controlled delivery" of the 
package, and the controlled substance, to the named addressee at 
the residence described in the affidavit; (5) that the controlled 
delivery would take place in the immediate future; and (6) that the 
officers desired to search the residence only after delivery of the 
package and controlled substance. 
3. That the search warrant issued by Judge Guy R. 
Burningham, Fourth District Court, State of Utah, on February 28, 
199 7, was validly issued by a neutral magistrate, based upon 
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probable cause, being supported by the affidavit of Sgt. Jerry 
Harper. 
4. That the search warrant particularly described the 
location to be searched. 
5. That the search warrant particularly described the things 
to be seized; which included the delivered package and controlled 
substance it contained, and also other items which are controlled 
substances, and associated drug related paraphernalia. 
6. That the search warrant did not contain false or 
misleading statements which would render it invalid on its face. 
7. That the search warrant sufficiently restricted the 
discretion of the officers in its execution by specifically 
limiting the time of execution to after the package and controlled 
substance were delivered and received at the residence. 
8. That the issuance of the search warrant, though 
"anticipatory" in nature, did not offend or violate statutory law 
regarding the grounds for the issuance of a search warrant, as 
found in section 77-23-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended 
(UCA); the Court finding specifically that section 77-23-202(3), 
UCA, applies to this matter. The Court holds that the plain 
reading this section's language does not place a restriction upon 
where the evidence of illegal conduct is located at the time the 
search warrant is issued, only that the material sought for seizure 
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must be evidence of illegal activity. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that under section 77-23-202(3), UCA, the issuance of the 
search warrant for the residence was valid, even though the 
evidence of illegal conduct was in the physical possession of the 
police and not at the location for which the search warrant was 
sought, at the time the search warrant was sought by Sgt. Harper, 
and issued by Judge Burningham. 
9. That the issuance of the search warrant, though 
"anticipa'tory" in nature did not violate provisions of Article I, 
Section 14, of the Constitution of Utah, nor the Fourth Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States. The Court is persuaded 
by, and fully adopts as controlling in this action, the case law 
decisions of sister states' courts, and decisions rendered in the 
federal courts, as propounded by the state, which uphold the 
constitutionality of "anticipatory search warrants." Further, the 
Court finds their direction instructive, when applied to this 
matter, as further basis for upholding the validity of the search 
warrant issued in this action. 
Specifically, in McNeill v Commonwealth, 395 SE2d 460, (Va 
App 1990) , the court, directed that the contraband should be on a 
sure course to it destination; and, that there must be probable 
cause to believe that the items to be seized will be at the place 
to be searched at the time the warrant is executed. The Court 
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concludes that in this matter the package, and controlled substance 
it contained, were on a sure course to its destination, and that 
the probable cause requirement was met as the magistrate was 
informed, via the affidavit, that the controlled substance would be 
on the premises at the time the warrant was executed. 
In State v Wine, 787 SW2d 31, (Tenn Crim App 1989) , the court 
upheld an anticipatory warrant, and directed that the affidavit 
should inform the magistrate that the known or suspected contraband 
will be delivered in the immediate future and the basis of the 
affiant's knowledge that the item will be delivered, and that the 
warrant explicitly condition its execution upon the occurrence of 
a specified event. The Court concludes that the affidavit set 
forth that the package was to be delivered in the immediate future, 
and the affiant's knowledge that the package would be delivered. 
Additionally, the warrant clearly expressed that the warrant could 
not be validly executed until after the package's delivery. 
Similarly, in State v Engel, 465 NW2d 787, (SD 1991) , the 
court directed that the warrant should be specific in limiting the 
conditions that govern the warrant's execution. The Court con-
cludes in this case, that the magistrate explicitly limited the 
discretion of the officers in when to execute the warrant, by 
including in it the command that the search occur only after the 
package's delivery. 
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10. That the Court concludes the officers acted in "good 
faith" on the issued search warrant, as per appellate court 
decisions in United States v Leon, 468 US 897 (1984) , and State v. 
Horton, 848 P2d 708 (Utah App 1993), and specifically that: (1) the 
issuing magistrate was not misled by information in the affidavit 
that affiant knew was false or would have known was false except 
for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the issuing magistrate 
did not wholly abandon his judicial role and fail to perform his 
neutral and detached function; (3) the warrant was not based on an 
affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) the 
warrant was not so facially deficient that it failed to particular-
ize the place to be search or the things to be seized, so the exe-
cuting officers could not presume it to be valid. 
11. That based upon the foregoing, the Defendant's motion to 
suppress evidence seized as a result of the search of the residence 
should be denied. 
ORDER 
THE COURT, having entered appropriate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and being fully apprised on the premises, now 
enters the following Order: 
BE IT HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED: 
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1. That Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a 
result of the search of the residence is DENIED. 
DATED this day of , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
JOHN C. BACKLUND 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM "B 
MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box L 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Memorandum In Support of Motion to 
Suppress 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Case No.961000485 
ROY WOMACK : 
Judge John C. Backlund 
Defendant. : 
COMES NOW the defendant and submits this memorandum in support of his 
Motion to Suppress Evidence previously filed herein. 
FACTS 
1 
On February 21, 1996, UPS attempted to deliver a package addressed Roy 
Womack at 120 West 1200 North in Orem, Utah. The address was not a valid 
address so the UPS employees searched the telephone book and found a Womack 
family living in Orem and delivered the package to that family, although the listing 
was not for a Roy Womack. The package had a return address identified to Eileen 
O'Hara in California. Although there were no Roy Womacks at the residence to 
which the package was delivered, the occupants opened the package and looked 
through its contents discovering some marijuana. The Womacks then took the 
package to the Orem City Police station and turned it over to the officers. 
Six days later, the UPS office received a call from a person who identified 
herself as Eileen O'Hara who, upon being told that the package had been delivered 
to the wrong address, told the UPS workers to deliver the package to 127 West 
1200 N., Orem, Utah. After the package had been turned over to the police, an 
individual who claimed to be Roy Womack contacted the Womacks who had 
received the package and was told the package was not there. 
The Orem police determined that the new address was a good address and 
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that the people living at the address were John and Kathleen Green. There was no 
record of a Roy Womack or any Womack living at the address. The law 
enforcement officers, while still in possession of the package, sought permission of 
the court to conduct a controlled delivery of the package and to conduct a search of 
the premises for additional evidence including "evidence of possession of the home 
and a nexus to the evidence." A warrant was issued which granted the request 
dated the 28lh day of February, 1996. That same day, the officers gave the package 
to UPS employees and then followed the employees to the address and waited while 
the package was delivered by UPS. The officers then kicked in the door and 
entered the residence, locating the defendant in the residence in possession of the 
marijuana, having opened the package. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges the search upon two grounds. First, there was not 
sufficient probable cause to believe that the person to whom the package was 
addressed lived at the residence, and if so, if he had access to the whole of the 
home, rented just one room or exactly what the living arrangement was. In fact, the 
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officers information did not state any probable cause to indicate that Womack lived 
at that location. The only evidence was that the address (which had already been 
erroneously written on the package), was supplied by the sender of the package. 
The police conducted no surveilance to verify that Roy Womack lived at the address 
prior to applying for the search warrant. The evidence which they set forth in the 
affidavit was that the Greens lived there. There was no evidence that there was any 
drug activity associated with the home or the occupants preceding the delivery of 
the package. In short, the affidavit failed to set forth any probable cause upon 
which a magistrate might rely in regard to the assertion that there were drugs on the 
premises at the time the affidavit was presented to the magistrate. At that time 
there was no information upon which the magistrate could rely to upon the question 
of contraband being in the residence sought to be searched since it was still in the 
possession of the police. The search warrant issued falsely sets forth in paragraph 
2, that the property sought to be seized "is most probably located at the premises 
also set forth below". Once the warrant issued, the police did not need to wait until 
they had the package delivered as the search warrant gave them authority to search 
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the residence at anytime within ten days of its issuance. In the event no one had 
answered the door, the officers, under this warrant could have gone in and searched 
the home pursuant to the warrant since the warrant authorized immediate search for 
"controlled substances, together with associated paraphernalia, including items 
capable of being used for the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana 
and other controlled substances, evidence that shows possession of the home and a 
nexus to the evidence, as well as the UPS package that is delivered and its 
contents." The warrant which authorizes such a broad area of search without 
supporting probable cause constitutes unreasonable search under the provisions of 
the statutes and Constitution of the State of Utah and the U.S. Constitution. 
The second problem with the warrant in this case is that is it an "anticipatory 
warrant" which authorizes a search in anticipation of an event taking place, to wit: 
the delivery of the package by UPS. Although there is a split of opinion on the issue 
of the legality of anticipatory warrants, Utah has yet to address the issue. Defendant 
argues that Utah should take the position of the those states which do not uphold 
anticipatory warrants. 
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The Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Berge, 634 P.2d 947(1981), was 
faced with a fact situation which closely resembles that of the present case. The 
officers received infonnation that a certain individual was receiving contraband 
tlirough the mail. Based upon the infonnation from the informant and the fact that a 
trained dog alerted to a package addressed to the defendant, the officers obtained a 
warrant for the search of a package which had arrived at the local UPS tenninal. 
The package was found to contain contraband. The officers then obtained a second 
search warrant to search the person and residence of the person to whom the 
package was addressed. The officers re-wrapped and it was arranged to have the 
package delivered by a police officer in a UPS truck and unifonn. The defendant 
accepted delivery of the package and took it into his residence, but before the police 
could execute the warrant, he left in his car. The officers could not locate him and 
went ahead and executed the search wanant finding the package and other 
contraband in the residence. The defendant returned during the search and was 
placed under anest. The court stated at 634 P.2d 948, "A search wanant may not 
be issued unless the issuing magistrate has probable cause to believe that a crime 
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was committed or is in the process of being committed." The court found that the 
package in that case, as in the present case, was in the possession of the police at 
the time the magistrate issued the warrant and therefore no crime was being 
committed. What the defendant did with the package would determine whether or 
not he had committed a crime. The court held that it was not reasonable to issue a 
warrant upon future acts that "can only come into being by actions of the persons 
seeking the warrant."634 P.2d at 949. 
Also, in People v. Ross, 659 N.E.2d 1319 (111. 1995), UPS accidently opened 
a letter which contained cocaine. They contacted law officers who confirmed the 
presence of cocaine. They made arrangements to have UPS deliver the letter to the 
addressee, the defendant. Prior to the delivery, and prior to the commission of a 
crime by the defendant, the officers obtained a warrant which allowed the search of 
the defendant's residence once the package had been delivered. UPS delivered the 
letter and five minutes later the officers executed the search warrant. The issue 
before the Illinois court was the same as the issue here. Did the Illinois statutes and 
constitution allow the issuance of anticipatory warrants? The Illinois statute 
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controlling the case, Section 108-3 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure states: 
(a)... upon the written complaint of any person under oath or affirmation 
which states facts sufficient to show probable cause and which particularly 
describes the place or person, or both, to be searched and the things to be 
seized, any judge may issue a search warrant for the seizure of the following: 
(1) Any instruments, articles or things which have been used in the 
commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, the offense in 
connection with which the warrant is issued. 
In interpreting the foregoing provision to prohibit anticipatory warrants, the 
court cited a number of Illinois cases to support its holding. 
The defendant asserts that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Section 77-23-
202, contains a similar requirement that the property sought to be seized must have 
been used or probable cause must be for crimes which have been or are being 
committed at the time of the issuance of the warrant. The Utah section provides: 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant t a search warrant if there is 
probable cause to believe it: 
(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(2) has been used or is being possessed for the purpose of being used to 
commit or conceal the commission of an offense; or 
(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 
It is clear from the language set forth above, that anticipatory warrants are not 
8 
authorized by the Utah statute. The language is in the present or past tense, i.e., 
was unlawfully acquired; is unlawfully possessed; has been used; or is being used; 
or is evidence of illegal conduct. Nothing in the section provides any indication to 
the effect anticipated conduct or things which may be used in the future for illegal 
purposes are basis for issuance of the warrant. 
In yet another similar fact and statutory situation, the Supreme Court of 
Colorado in People v. Poirez, 904 P2d. 883 (Colo. 1995) reached the same 
conclusion as to the legality of anticipatory search warrants. In that case, the UPS 
again discovered a package which contained contraband and reported it to the 
authorities. The package was turned over to the Vail police. The police agency 
investigated the address and the addressee, finding no record of the addressee at the 
address listed. The officers obtained a warrant to search the premises which was 
conditioned upon two facts. (1) A task force agent will deliver the package to the 
residence to be searched. (2) Someone from inside the residence will accept the 
package and take it inside. The package was delivered to the address and upon 
delivery a person took the package into the residence and with the door still open 
9 
called for the addressee whereupon the defendant appeared and took the package 
and was arrested. The court held that the use by the legislature of the present tense 
language required the evidence to be located at the premises to be searched at the 
time the warrant was issued. The court determined that the warrant was an 
anticipatory warrant and unlawful since the evidence was not present at the 
premises until after taken there by the officers. Again, defendant submits that the 
Utah statutes also require probable cause to be based upon information which 
indicates a crime has occurred or is occurring in order to justify the issuance of a 
search warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant submits that the court should suppress 
any evidence obtained against the defendant as a result of the search warrant 
executed in this case upon the grounds that there was no probable cause upon which 
a magistrate could find probable cause that a crime had been committed or was 
being committed and for the additional reason that the statutes and constitution of 
Utah do not allow anticipatory warrants to allow premises to be searched upon the 
10 
possible occurance of an event. For those reasons and the case law set forth above, 
defendant requests the order of this court suppressing the evidence illegally obtained 
in this matter. 
Dated this .^7/ "clay of January, 1996. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document to the 
following: 
CURTIS L. LARSON 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
this^Z—Tday of January, 1996. 
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Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have been 
a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the 
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. 
During the time I have been a peace officer I have received 
over 225 hours of specialized training for law enforcement 
work including 185 hours of training specific to narcotics 
work. Narcotics classes I have taken include training in 
surveillance, operation of surveillance and electronic 
investigatory equipment, field testing of drugs and drug 
recognition. I have also received training in airport, bus 
station, train station, and small package interdiction from 
the Drug Enforcement Administration in 1995. I also received 
further small package interdiction training during the Utah 
Narcotics Officer's Association training conference in May 
1995. Other training at that conference included undercover 
techniques, mexican methamphetamine, drug pipe line stops, and 
drug related homicides. I also received training at that 
conference on Erez controlled substance detection sprays. As 
an officer I have participated in hundreds of operations 
involving the undercover purchase of narcotics and/or the 
arrest of person for substance abuse related violations. I 
have experience working undercover providing first hand 
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experience with narcotics trafficking. I have supervised 
narcotics investigations for the Provo Police Department since 
1992. I am currently designated as the department 
trainer/specialist in the areas of fingerprinting, 
surveillance, video equipment, narcotics and drug 
recognition. 
On February 21, 1996, the United Parcel Service attempted to 
deliver a package addressed to Roy Womack at 12 0 West 120 0 
North, Orem, Utah. It was discovered that this address did 
not exist. UPS employees discovered a Womack family in the 
phone book living at 233 East 1000 South in Orem, Utah. Being 
the only Womack listing in Orem, the package was delivered to 
chat location. The package was sent from an Eileen O'Hara at 
3002 Honolulu Avenue #18, La Crescenta, California, 91214. 
The Womack family that received the package felt that the 
package could be for them and that the name was simply wrong. 
Therefore, the package was opened by the Womack1 s and 
marijuana was discovered inside. The package and its 
contents, including the marijuana, were then taken to the Orem 
Police Department by the Womack's. The approximate weight of 
the marijuana found in the package is one ounce. 
That on February 27, 1996, the United Parcel Service in 
California received a call from an individual identifying 
herself as Eileen O'Hara wondering where the package was that 
she sent. A phone number was left with UPS in California. 
UPS in California contacted UPS in Provo, Utah wanting 
assistance in locating the package. A UPS employee in Provo, 
Utah contacted the phone number given by Eileen O'Hara and did 
in fact make contact with her. Eileen O'Hara was very irate 
concerning the delivery of her package and was told where the 
package was delivered and that the package would be recovered 
and delivered at a new address given to UPS by Eileen O'Hara. 
The new address of delivery given was 127 West 1200 North, 
Orem, Utah. 
That on February 27, 1996, the Womack family who received the 
package originally received a visitor at their door who 
identified himself as Roy Womack. This individual requested 
the package that had been delivered to the address, but was 
told that the package was not there. Later that same evening, 
an individual who identified as Eileen O'Hara telephoned the 
Womack residence requesting the package. She was advised also 
that the package was not there. 
That the new address of 127 West 1200 North is a good address. 
Your affiant has learned through Orem utility records and Orem 
Police Department records that the individual living at that 
address is a John Green. Mountain Fuel utility records also 
indicate that the individual living at that address is a 
Kathleen Green. The information from the Utah County 
Sherifff s ^ Oj£f ice is that Kathleen Green and John Green are 
L'marrSed'^ rA1' '.All/' 
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6. It is my experience that shipment of marijuana in this 
quantity by UPS or mail is very common. The quantity often 
being sold on the street is one eighth ounce. If sold at the 
present sale price of $3 0 per one eighth ounce baggie, it 
would sell for a street value of $240. One ounce if purchased 
in that quantity would cost approximately $150 allowing a 
potential profit of $90, 
7. Your affiant has conducted several searches of homes in Utah 
County where it was found that drugs, including marijuana were 
being sold from the home. In virtually every instance when 
officers found narcotics, officers also located associated 
paraphernalia and evidence including but not limited to 
scales, buy/owe sheets, equipment for storage, packaging and 
use of narcotics, cash, weapons, and other associated items. 
Marijuana and other narcotics while quite valuable are very 
small in volume and can be quickly and easily hidden in 
clothing or destroyed if notice is given of intent to search. 
8. It is your affiant's desire to make a "controlled United 
Parcel Service delivery" of this package to the residence 
indicated by the shipping party. Your affiant would like to 
conduct a search of the residence and the person of 
individuals present immediately following the delivery to 
recover the narcotics and associated evidence while 
determining who received the drugs. 
9. It is also your affiant's desire to search for evidence in the 
house that shows possession of the home and a nexus to the 
evidence. 
10. Your affiant expects to locate additional controlled 
substances in the residence together with associated 
paraphernalia and items used or capable of being used for the 
storage, use, production, or distribution of controlled 
substances. Your affiant also expects to locate the UPS 
package which is to be delivered which is further described as 
a small cardboard box approximately 8" x 14" and 2-1/2" deep. 
The package carries UPS delivery track number 1Z 926 986 
081006 171 8 and is addressed to a Roy Womack. 
11. The residence is more particularly described as the home 
located at 127 West 1200 North, Orem, Utah. It is further 
described as an older blue home with white trim. It is 
located on the south side of 1200 North and faces north. The 
numerals "127" are posted on the front of the house. 
12. It my experience that persons who use and sell narcotics 
commonly store narcotics and paraphernalia in vehicles, 
Failure to search vehicles located on the premises together 
with the curtilage, including outside storage units, boxes, 
buildings, and enclosed areas will likely result in missing 
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13. Following delivery of the package, your affiant desires to 
conduct a search of the residence to which the package is 
delivered immediately following the delivery to look for the 
narcotics/drugs and other relevant evidence including, but not 
limited "to scales, buy/owe sheets, equipment for storage, 
packaging and use of narcotics, cash, weapons, and other 
associated items and evidence demonstrating use and possession 
of the home and the contraband located. 
Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by 
this court authorizing the search of the residence, together with 
the curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the 
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at 
the time of search which by registration or indicia or use or 
possession are owned or used by persons located at the address of 
127 West 1200 North, Orem, Utah. 
Dated this day of February 19 96 
{X^pJZ^\ 
ABPlANT-^rry Harper 
Provo Palace Department 
Subsc r ibed and sworn before me on the 
7^^**^ 1996, / / ' ^ 0 _ _ . £_.M. 
day of 
Afete 
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Defendants 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Magistrate's It has been established by oath or 
Endorsement affirmation made or submitted to me this 
_J2^?^day of February 1996 that there is 
probable cause to believe the following: 
J& 1. The property described below: 
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed; 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of 
an offense; or 
is evidence of illegal conduct. 
2. The property described below is most probably 
located at the premises also set forth below. 
3. The person or entity in possession of the property 
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct. 
That this warrant may be served without notice of 
~ intent or authority to search, due to the fact that 
the property to be searched for may be easily 
secreted, disposed of, or destroyed if notice of 
intent to search is given. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed following 
delivery of the UPS package containing marijuana described in the 
affidavit to conduct a search of the residence to which the package 
is delivered together with the curtilage including any 
outbuildings, vehicles, and the person of any individuals present 
at the time of the execution of this warrant, including vehicles 
belonging to those individuals. 
You are directed to search for the presence of the following 
property: controlled substances, together with associated 
paraphernalia, including items used or capable of being used for 
the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana and 
other controlled substances, evidence that shows possession of the 
home and a nexus to the evidence, as well as the UPS package that 
is delivered and its contents. 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring 
the property forthwith before me at the above Court or to hold the 
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You 
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person 
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where 
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with 
a written inventory of any property seized identifying the place 
where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED: 
^J&J I N THE DAYTIME ONLY. 
.^y^^^^-THIS WARRANT MAY BE SERVED WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE OF 
AUTHORITY OR INTENT. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE 
OF ISSUANCE. 
DATED t h i s day of F e b r u a r y , 1996 , J/140a A .M. 
-•, / - { O * ^ " i V 
f£\ i(jH\Mh\ 
^ 6 .COUNTY 
rtf=PFrtSfc ATTOnNt 
ftfAh 
